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ABSTRACT
There is growing evidence that organizational architectures of military Command and Con-
trol (C2) systems are evolving from multiple layered, hierarchical (top-down) commands
to more adaptable commands of networked teams. This research presents a “first prin-
ciples” approach to developing a computational framework to measure and compare the
organizational architecture of any military unit or commercial business. The developed
construct takes the form of a game that imitates processes an organization must accomplish
to reach an objective. Supported by mathematical analysis, we implement the framework
as a simulation to measure the effectiveness of various organizational architectures. We
explore performance advantages of different architectures when an organization’s objective
and/or operating environment change.
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Executive Summary
In this thesis, we consider the design of Command and Control (C2) architecture from the
perspective of operations research. We investigate how one measures the performance of
an organization in conducting a mission, and we contrast various C2 architectures in their
ability to accomplish tasks. This research is inspired by retired Army General Stanley S.
McChrystal’s book Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World. A
key lesson in Team of Teams is that the C2 organization and methods that work well in
one environment for a given mission might not work well in a different environment and/or
for a different mission. The implication is that an organization that is not adapted to its
environment is bound to perform poorly.
This thesis presents a first-principles approach to creating a quantitative framework, in the
form of a game, which imitates the basic processes of an organization. Using a lexicon
familiar to Organization Theory, we examine the processes and structures of organizations
to identify how they affect the way an organization performs its mission, solves problems,
and maximizes productivity and efficiency. Specifically, we focus on the number and types
of people in an organization, their interactions, and the internal processes within an or-
ganization. We implement our game using a Monte-Carlo style simulation that mimics
organizational processes and yet is simple enough to explain and be supported by mathe-
matical analysis. Specifically, we consider the situation where an organization is tasked with
matching the letters in a given word when sampling from a random distribution of letters.
The game measures the expected number of discrete time steps it takes an organizational
architecture to complete its objective in a particular environment.
We use the notation and mathematics of Discrete-Time Markov Chains to quantitatively
measure the performance of an architecture. Using this framework we represent game play
as a series of random transitions from one state to another. We begin by examining simple
architectures and incrementally considering more complicated ones.
We start with a single agent, working alone to complete match a single letter objective.
Using mathematics and simulation we measure this most simple architecture and establish
our foundation for incremental expansion. Our research continues to explore multiple
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independent players. These players attempt to match identical tasks in parallel without any
interaction. We show that adding independent (non-connected) workers to an architecture
improves overall performance, but at a much slower rate than if the workers were connected
in a manner that allows them to communicate and cooperate. We show that performance
improves significantly when players can share letters between them.
Challenges arise as an architecture’s size grows. As workers are added, there is an expo-
nential growth in the potential number of connections between them; an organization that
includes all such connections eventually ultimately suffers in performance. We show how
hierarchies avoid this by carefully selecting connections betweenworkers, therebymaximiz-
ing performance advantages of connections while minimizing costs. Because these larger
organizational architectures and/or objectives quickly result in complicated mathematics,
we rely more heavily on simulation as a means for analysis.
We examine hierarchies that have limited, one-way communication from the worker at the
bottom to the manager at the top. We showwhy such hierarchies are commonly designed for
organizations with specific, repetitive objectives and that operate in a stable environments.
We study a series of architectures and demonstrate the performance impact of choosing the
correct set of tasks to assign workers.
Next, we consider architectures with two-way communication rules for sharing letters with
other workers via a manager. Now, unused letters are sent to the manager and distributed
to workers who need them most. Such cooperation yields increased performance and less
sensitivity to the set of tasks that are assigned to workers.
We also explore architecture robustness, namely how architectures perform in the presence
of changing objectives or changing environments. To do sowe introduce a two-tier hierarchy
with a more complex objective. We use our simulation to measure its performance and then
repeat measurements through a series of experiments in which we add more workers, vary
worker task assignments, perturb letter distributions, and change objective words. This
first set of experiments investigates the effects of changing task assignments. We find that
when an objective and letter distribution are known, a specific set of task assignments can
be chosen to achieve best performance. Second, we change the operating environment
by switching letter distributions. We find that highly customized architectures perform
well when operating in a stable environment, but for an architecture to be robust, it must
xvi
equally assign tasks to account for any possible letter distribution. Lastly, we change an
organization’s objective and test its performance. In some cases, we find that customized
architectures can perform very poorly or even fail to complete their objective. To increase
robustness, we introduce the concept of a worker without an assigned task who can match
any letter not already assigned.
Through the lens of operations research, we understand why the Joint Special Operations
Task Force (JSOTF) originally failed in Iraq and why General McChrystal’s “Team of
Teams” concept was a better fit. We assert that organizations with a customized architecture
tailored to complete a specific objective in a stable environmentwill performmost efficiently,
however performance will suffer in the case of volatility in the objective or environment.
Like a customized hierarchy tailored toward a specific objective in a stable environment,
the JSOTF’s performance against Al-Qaeda in Iraq was originally unsuccessful because its
architecture was too specialized and less robust to external changes.
As General McChrystal describes in Team of Teams, his restructuring efforts changed the
JSOTF’s organizational architecture. The architecture became decentralized with decision
making authorized at lower levels, thereby freeing up available work capacity for senior
leaders. Additionally, the task force’s architecture maximized the advantages of cooperation
while limiting connections between workers by using teams and connecting them horizon-
tally. McChrystal’s new task force saw increased effectiveness fighting a fluid enemy in
multiple arenas. Its architecture was defined by a centralized structure with a strict hier-
archy of authority. The task force was comprised of specialized units that didn’t have the
connections and processes to effectively share information or cooperate due to the vertical
nature of its architecture. Through our research we address why, while being extremely
efficient at their assigned objectives, organizational architectures like that of the JSOTF, are
less effective against an unpredictable and agile enemy.
Lastly, motivated by McChrystal’s story, we comment on features of resilient architectures
to understand the organizational changes described in Team of Teams. Perhaps the most
important piece of the Team of Teams narrative is not the final topology of the task force’s
architecture, but the importance of an organization’s ability to identify the need for change,
know what protocols are necessary to effect the needed change, and initiate the change in
time for it to be relevant.
xvii
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"To win we had to change. Surprisingly, that change was less about tactics 
or new technology than it was about the internal architecture and culture of 
our force." 
                                             — General S. McChrystal, Team of Teams (2015)
1.1 Motivation
In this thesis, we consider the design of Command and Control (C2) architecture from the
perspective of operations research. We investigate how one measures the performance of
an organization in conducting a mission, and we contrast various C2 architectures in their
ability to accomplish complicated tasks.
This research is inspired by retired Army General Stanley S. McChrystal’s book titled,
Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (McChrystal et al.,
2015). On July 15, 2015, McChrystal spoke to the student body of the United States Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS), as part of the Secretary of the Navy Guest Lecture Series,
about the story told in Team of Teams. In his lecture, McChrystal explains the challenges
he faced after taking command of the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) in
Iraq beginning in September 2003. Despite being superiorly trained and equipped, his
forces were unsuccessful in combating Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a very aggressive and
unpredictable foe. The book details the transition of the JSOTF from a traditional military
organization, reliant on planning and rehearsal, into a flatter, more integrated, and team
oriented architecture that was able to aggregate information and adapt to external events
faster than the enemy.
The story told in Team of Teams is relevant to both military and civilian organizations.
Military units and civilian corporations alike are comprised of people, internal processes,
and reporting relationships that were designed, or have evolved, to accomplish a mission.
A key lesson in Team of Teams is that the C2 organization and methods that work well
in one environment for a given mission might not work well in a different environment
1
and/or for a different mission. The implication is that an organization that is not adapted
to its environment is bound to perform poorly. The story of the JSOTF’s organizational
transformation to overcome the challenges posed by AQI is presented as an exemplar for
how modern organizations ought to adapt in the face of growing operational complexity.
Using Organization Theory (OT) we examine the processes and structures of organizations
to identify how they affect the way an organization performs its mission, solves problems,
and maximizes productivity and efficiency. Specifically, we focus on the number and types
of people, their interactions, and the internal processes within an organization. In OT, this
is referred to as Organizational Architecture or Organizational Structure. In this thesis, we
use the term architecture because it implies more than just the structure of how people are
organized (as seen on an organizational chart), it includes all communication connections,
authority relationships, and internal processes.
In response to the JSOTF’s lack of effectiveness combating AQI, McChrystal implemented
major changes to its architecture and culture to increase adaptability in its new complex
and rapidly changing environment. Large civilian organizations alike are changing their
organizational architectures in order to remain relevant and profitable. But how does one
know if an organization is appropriately adapted for a given mission and/or environment?
Moreover, is it possible to design an optimal C2 architecture? And how can the field of
operations research help to understand these issues?
2
1.2 Thesis Objectives
In this research, we investigate how tomeasure an organization’s effectiveness in conducting
a mission. We examine how changing an organization’s mission and/or operating environ-
ment impacts performance. To do so, we introduce a simplified and stylized game as a proxy
for the tasks and environment faced by an organization. We study various C2 architectures
in terms of their ability to play this game. We analyze their performance both analytically
and via simulation.
In this thesis, we re-tell McChrystal’s story from an operations research perspective. We
comment on features of an agile architecture that allow an organization to remain effective
across a complex and fluid set of objectives and environments.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review relevant
literature in organizational theory, military C2, network warfare, and network science. In
Chapter 3, we introduce our game, its design, and how we measure the performance of a
given C2 architecture when playing it. In Chapter 4, we present our results supported by
analytic and numerical experiments. In Chapter 5, we summarize our findings and discuss
opportunities for additional research.
3




2.1 Military Command and Control
Command and Control (C2) means different things to different people. The complexities
of its processes and systems form the underlying fabric that allow military units, large
and small, to function in a coordinated fashion. As our adversaries adopt networked C2
architectures, so must those who seek to destroy or disrupt them. To do so, we require
an understanding of how organizations are structured and how vital C2 architecture is to
success against a dynamic enemy.
According to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 (JP-1), to command is defined as
“The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned
and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission” (United States Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 2017). “Command and control is the means by which a commander synchronizes
and/or integrates force activities in order to achieve unity of command” (United States Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 2017). JP-1 continues to describe C2 accordingly:
C2 ties together all the operational functions and tasks and applies to all lev-
els of war and echelons of command. C2 functions are performed through
an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and pro-
cedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and
controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.
In their NPS thesis titled, “Command and Control: An Introduction,” Bethmann andMalloy
(1989) discuss the complex nature and historical significance of C2. In their lexicon,
effective C2 is “the net result of the successful interaction of a complex architecture that
is comprised of people, procedures, and equipment” (Bethmann and Malloy, 1989). They
contrast effective C2with unfortunate examples of breakdowns inmilitary C2. For example,
the 1983 invasion of Grenada (Operation URGENT FURY) showcased communication and
coordination difficulties between the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. During
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the initial days of the operation, the four services used different radio frequencies for
controlling military strikes. The initial C2 architecture in place required Army ground units
to contact headquarters in North Carolina and then messages were relayed via satellite to
Navy leadership aboard aircraft carriers (Bethmann and Malloy, 1989). As a result of these
C2 failures and similar challenges during the failed 1980 Iranian hostage rescue mission,
the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed to reorganize the entire military’s chain of
command. These sweeping changes marked the largest change in military C2 since the
services were first created (Lederman, 1999).
Painter et al. (2009), in their NPS thesis titled, “Reorganizing for IrregularWarfare,” present
five domains to frame their discussion of C2 and organizational design: (1) Structure, (2)
Environment, (3) Work Processes, (4) Human Resources, and (5) Culture. Of these, we
focus attention on the following.
Structure. Painter et al. (2009) defines structure as “How an organization is designed to
facilitate information flow and complete its work (tasks).” An organization’s structure is
commonly represented on a chart that uses boxes and lines to group organization members
into assigned roles, depict formal reporting relationships, and state spans of control (i.e.,
the number of employees reporting to a supervisor; see Daft, 2001). Additionally, organi-
zational structure divides “labor into distinct tasks and then achieves coordination among
them” (Mintzberg, 1989). Example structures include mechanistic, organic, matrix, virtual,
clusters, network, funtionalized, and divisionalized (Morgan, 2006).
Environment . All organizations operate in an environment. “Organizational environment
is defined as everything that exists outside the boundary of the organization and has the
potential to affect all or part of the organization” (Daft, 2001). The environment includes
elements such as trends in industry, government restrictions, customer pressures, quantity
and quality of resources and/or information, the financial community, etc. Morgan (2006)
incorporates an important temporal element in her definition; the “degree of stability or
change, abundance or scarcity of key resources, competition, political/legal/technological/-
social/market conditions.”
Work Processes. Work processes are the means by which an organization transforms raw
material, information, and/or other inputs into some desired output. For example, a furniture
maker uses fabric, wood, and other material to assemble an end product like a sofa. This
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work process is called manufacturing. To better understand work processes, consider the
two following scenarios in which a Sailor servicesmultiple helicopter engines: 1) The Sailor
performs the first step of the servicing procedure sequentially on each engine before starting
step 2. He performs one step on each engine on each rotation. 2) The Sailor performs all
the servicing steps on the first engine before moving on to the next one. He completes one
engine at a time until all are serviced. The Sailor in both scenarios is assigned the same task
(service the helicopter engines) but accomplishes it using two different work processes.
When an organization is divided into different departments or divisions, work processes
establish the level of interaction between groups. If a single department can accomplish
its task without “outside” assistance then very little interaction with other departments
is needed. However, if a task requires collaboration between multiple sub-organizations,
appropriate work processes must exist to enable them to work together. This type of
work process “requires extensive horizontal linkages in the form of liaisons to coordinate
activities” (Painter et al., 2009).
As noted by Galbraith et al. (2001), “Organizational architecture is about the structure,
processes, organizational roles, power and authority, reporting relationships. . . not people
practices (staffing and selection, performance feedback, learning and development) or strat-
egy (vision, direction, competitive advantage) or reward systems (goals, scorecards, and
metrics. . . values and behaviors, and compensation/rewards).” For this reason, we focus
on organizational architecture because it represents tangible components of organizational
design that can be concretely modeled and manipulated.
2.2 Three Dimensions of C2 Architecture
Alberts and Hayes (2006) identify the following three dimensions of C2 architecture.
2.2.1 Allocation of Decision Rights
The key question here is: Who gets to make what type of decisions?
Members of an organization who have different jobs or perform specific roles will have
varying levels of authority to make decisions commensurate with their position. Decision
making authority of a more centralized organization resides at higher levels (e.g., a CEO or
7
Commanding Officer). In a decentralized organization, the authority to make decisions is
disseminated lower among the ranks.
The allocation of decision rights is usually a function of rank, position, experience, or estab-
lished rules and regulations. Decision rights also are impacted by time and circumstances.
In the military, a person’s decision making authority is commonly associated with rank or
position, but this is not always the case. Often, a lower-ranking soldier must make a poten-
tially risky or costly decision because he is authorized to do so when certain circumstances
are met and there is not adequate time to seek approval from superiors.
2.2.2 Distribution of Information
The key question here is: Who knows what? Who gets which resources?
Alberts and Hayes (2006) use the term information to include knowledge, data, experience,
and understanding. We include an organization’s physical resources in this discussion as
well, because the proper allocation of resources to the correct person(s) can directly impact
an organization’s effectiveness. Typically, the amount and type of information or resources
that a member of an organization is allocated varies upon the task or role assigned.
The distribution of information and resources is linked with the allocation of decision rights.
An organization with more decentralized decision making requires increased information
sharing/access so those empowered to make decisions can more effectively decide correctly.
In more hierarchical organizations, only top leaders need access to all the information since
they are responsible for most decision making.
The spectrum of information distribution has three extremes: 1) One person has all the
information and resources and allocates them as needed; 2) Everyone has access to all
information and resources; or 3) People in different parts of an organization have information
and resources that are not made available to others, resulting in no one having access to all
of it. Depending on the organization’s strategy and objective, its rules for allocation will
fall somewhere in-between.
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2.2.3 Patterns and Policies Governing Interactions
The key question here is: Who communicates or interacts with whom? What rules are in
place that constrain or enhance collaboration?
The patterns and policies governing interactions within an organization are the foundational
mechanisms that define an organization’s hierarchical structure and degree of collaboration.
In its simplest form, this idea can be visualized as the formal policies and reporting rela-
tionships shown as lines on an organizational chart. But not every interpersonal connection
or informal collaboration can be formalized and depicted on a chart. These informal in-
teractions and practices “can be considered the fuzzy connections you don’t see between
people in the ‘white space’ of an organizational chart” (Galbraith et al., 2001).
Inmore hierarchical organizations such as a large department store, the owner communicates
with the general manager, who leads department managers. The department managers
interact with their respective clerks to execute day-to-day business. In such an organization,
the patterns and policies do not usually provide a means for a clerk to communicate with the
ownerwithout going through his or her chain of command. In less hierarchical organizations
there are fewer layers of authority, resulting in fewer vertical (up and down layers) linkages
but increased numbers of horizontal (laterally across a layer) connections. This results in
increased communication and collaboration, essential for organizations that must change
due to pressures received from their environments (French and Bell, 1999).
2.3 Background on Organization Theory
In parallel to the work on military organizations and C2, there is a large body of research
on organizations. Daft (2001) defines organizations as “(1) social entities that (2) are
goal oriented, (3) are designed as deliberately structured and coordinated activity systems,
and (4) are linked to the external environment.” The study of an organization’s design,
strategy, and leadership is known as Organization Theory (OT), which centers on “creating
a community of collective effort that yields more than the sum of each individual’s efforts
and results” (Galbraith et al., 2001).
Organizational theory considers a wide variety of organizational architectures, each of
which is “the complex product of [its] history, strategy, and environmental circumstances”
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(Nadler et al., 1992). We now review historical perspectives of OT.
2.3.1 Scientific Management Perspective
Frederick W. Taylor’s “Scientific Management” theory was the prominent architecture type
during the early years of OT. Popularized in his 1911 book, The Principles of Scientific
Management, Taylor’s theory encourages “scientifically determined jobs and management
practices as the way to improve efficiency and labor productivity” (Daft, 2012). This type
of organizational architecture dominated OT during the Industrial Revolution because it
focused on efficiency and productivity.
Often known as Taylor’s “one best way” movement, the scientific management perspective
postulates that all jobs and organizational decisions be designed to find the optimum way
to complete a task (Taylor, 1911). His theory recommends “managers develop precise,
standard procedures for doing each job, select workers with appropriate abilities, train
workers in the standard procedures, carefully plan work, and provide wage incentives to
increase output” (Daft, 2001).
The scientific management architecture is hierarchical with a leader at the top, one or more
layers of management, and workers who occupy the lowest level, as seen in Figure 2.1.
It is characterized by two or more layers whose members are connected vertically with
those who are superior and/or inferior to them. It has very few (if any) lateral connections
within a layer. This architecture is well-suited for organizations with objectives that are
decomposable into repetitive tasks that do not require significant skill or problem solving
for a worker to perform. For this reason, scientific management architectures are sometimes
referred to “mechanistic” because of the machine-like efficiencies they strive to achieve.
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Figure 2.1. Example Hierarchy Architecture
An example organization that would benefit from a scientific management style architecture
is a notional single product factory. This organization’s objective is to manufacture one
product as many times as possible with great efficiency in order to maximize profit. Factory
workers perform their assigned task, following strict repetitive procedures while managers
improve methods, tools, or procedures to further streamline worker processes. Complicated
tasks are split up and assigned to multiple workers in order to increase efficiency.
Using Albert’s three dimensions of organizational architecture, we characterize scientific
management style architectures:
1. Allocation of Decision Rights:
This type of architecture is mostly hierarchical with the majority of the decision mak-
ing power and responsibility residing with senior leadership. Managers execute their
role of continually striving for increased output by improving processes, procedures,
and employee training. Managers funnel questions and problems to top leaders for
resolution if a problem arises they don’t have a prescribed solution for. Similarly,
low-level employees receive specific tasks to which they are given just enough au-
thority to accomplish. Workers follow detailed procedures from which they are not
allowed to deviate.
2. Distribution of Information:
Similar to decision rights, senior leadership controls the majority of information. In
a hierarchy, connections between people are primarily vertical, spanning up or down
a single layer at a time. This means that information received in one part of the
organization must travel vertically as high as necessary to then trickle down to other
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low-level employees “across” an organization. Low-level employees require no more
information or resources necessary beyond what’s needed to perform their tasks.
3. Patterns and Policies Governing Interactions:
Hierarchical architectures are very effective at accomplishing a single objective at a
large scale because superfluous interactions between members are avoided. By nature
of Taylor’s system, the manager’s primary function is to constantly seek opportunities
for improving efficiency. As a result, any function or characteristic that differentiates
a worker from a machine is minimized (Mintzberg, 1989).
The benefits of scientific management are realized by organizations which have a singular
(or very small set of) objectives and operate in a stable environment. Manufacturers benefit
from “Taylorism” because complicated objectives (i.e., building a car) are broken into
smaller tasks which specialized workers can do quickly.
The downfalls of scientific management reside in its slowness to adapt to changes in the
organization’s objective or environment. A factory designed to build military tanks uses
specialized equipment and has workers trained to accomplish tank-building related tasks.
If the factory is forced to begin building boats, the existing procedures and divisions of
labor would no longer be effective. This should come as no surprise; workers are like
“single-purpose mechanisms designed to transform specific inputs into specific outputs and
can engage in different activities if they are explicitly modified or redesigned to do so”
(Morgan, 2006). Organizations using the principles of scientific management have high
productivity and efficiently use resources to maximize output but their specificity limits
flexibility and innovation in dynamic environments.
2.3.2 Bureaucratic Organizations
There is another OT perspective focusing on efficiency that emerged during the Industrial
Revolution. Bureaucracy Theory, popularized in Max Weber’s posthumously published
book titled Economy and Society (Weber, 1922), emphasizes “designing and managing
organizations on an impersonal, rational basis through such elements as clearly defined au-
thority and responsibility, formal record-keeping, and uniform application of standard rules”
(Daft, 2012). Bureaucracy theory combines Taylor’s scientific management with Henri
Fayol’s proposed 14 administrative principles of management. Together, these perspectives
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“formed the foundation for modern management practice and organizational design” until
the 1980s (Daft, 2012).
2.3.3 Hawthorne Studies
A series of experiments investigating human aspects of work and working conditions were
conducted at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company between 1927 and
1932 (Carey, 1967). The work of Elton Mayo and other contributors suggest that social and
psychological needs are important in motivating employees. This was a major departure
from previous mechanistic theories and “the publication of these findings led to a revolution
in worker treatment and laid the groundwork for subsequent work examining treatment of
workers, leadership, motivation, and human resource management” (Daft, 2012).
Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) interpret the Hawthorne Studies and realize intangible
actions and behaviors are present in organizations. “Specifically, their observations about
the presence of informal structure - unofficial relationships within the work group - con-
stituted the simple realization that mutual adjustment served as an important coordination
mechanism in all organizations” (Mintzberg, 1989). Their work highlighted the importance
of including human relations and worker well-being in future organizational theories.
2.3.4 Contingency Theory
Scholars of contingency theory investigate relationships between an organization’s architec-
ture and its environment. “Contingency means that one thing depends on other things, and
for organizations to be effective there must be a ‘goodness of fit’ between their structure and
various contingency factors” (Daft, 2012). According to Daft (2012), such factors include:
size, organizational technology, environment, goals and strategy, and culture.
In a popular 1967 study, Harvard researchers Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch examined mul-
tiple categories of American companies. As documented by Mintzberg (1989), Lawrence
and Lorsch found that “environmental conditions surrounding the organization affected
its choice of [architecture] significantly”. For example, Lawrence and Lorsch determined
shipping container companies are well-suited for stable operating environments and had
mechanistic architectureswhereas plastic industry businesses operate inmore dynamic envi-
ronments and require architectures which facilitate collaboration and flexibility (Mintzberg,
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1989). In general, contingency theory centers around the concept that there is no one best
architecture. What works for one organization may not work for another. “Contingency
theory means ‘it depends’ ” (Daft, 2001).
2.3.5 Organic Organizations
Beginning in the 1970s, the rate of technological change increased rapidly, causing mech-
anistic and bureaucratic organizations to struggle. A new theory of organizational archi-
tecture, coined “organic” by Tom Burns and G.M. Stalker in 1961, emerged which was
human-centric and distinguished itself from previous OT perspectives by its “absence of
standardization in the organization” (Mintzberg, 1989). Organic architectures rely on the
human elements in an organization, not formal protocols and procedures. They are more
adaptive and best suited for organizations needing rapid innovation and flexible responses
to pressures from working in dynamic operating environments.
Organic architectures benefit from decentralization which empowers decision making at
lower levels in an organization. Members are given roles not jobs, with responsibilities
and not procedures. This less formal atmosphere encourages discussion and collaboration
among peers. Organic organizations have architectures that emphasize horizontal commu-
nication and interactions to ensure information flows across all groups and teams. “The
widespread sharing of information enables all employees to have complete information
about the company so they can act quickly” (Daft, 2012).
2.3.6 The Rise of Teams
The discussion of team-based work processes in OT began with organic architectures.
Teams are the “fundamental work unit” (Daft, 2012) of organic organizations because they
encourage collaboration and innovation. “Teams bring people together to work interdepen-
dently and share collective responsibility for outcomes” (Galbraith et al., 2001). Figure 2.2
is a graphical representation of a possible team architecture.
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Figure 2.2. Example Team Architecture
Galbraith et al. (2001) distinguishes teams into three categories:
Issue Teams. These teams are assembled temporarily to solve a specific problem or accom-
plish a time-critical task. When complete, the team is disbanded and members resume their
original roles in the organization.
Work Groups. These teams are clusters of people in an organization who share a common
goal or do highly-related work. Being assigned to the same team enhances collaboration
and accountability.
Cross-Business Teams. Cross-business teams have representation from multiple groups,
bringing different perspectives from across an organization into the team. These teams sup-
port rapid innovation because of the diverse set of knowledge different members contribute.
“[Cross-business teams] are an essential component of an integrated, flattened organization”
(Galbraith et al., 2001).
Using Albert’s dimensions of C2 architecture, we characterize team-based organizations:
1. Allocation of Decision Rights:
In an organic architecture decision making is decentralized and often delegated to
lower organizational levels. “People are encouraged to take care of problems by
working with one another. . . using their discretion to make decisions” (Daft, 2012).
Teams are granted necessary freedoms to seek solutions to their problems without
having to get approval from superiors.
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2. Distribution of Information:
Information in organic organizations is shared quickly and made available to anyone
who may benefit. Organic architectures emphasize “horizontal communication, with
information flowing in all directions within and across departments and hierarchical
levels” (Daft, 2012). In addition to sharing “bottom-up” information, strategy and
guidance from superiors are disseminated across the entire organization to empower
all members to make decisions that best support the organization. In the military we
call this “knowing Commander’s Intent.”
3. Patterns and Policies Governing Interactions:
Organic architectures have few formal rules which might constrain member actions
and innovation. The absence of formalization allows an organic architecture to
self-organize and adapt to accomplish the task at hand. Instead of departments of
like-minded workers, organic architectures utilize teams comprised of people with
different skills and knowledge to address a common goal.
Organic, team-based architectures allow an organization to adapt to changes. They are
best suited for smaller organizations that rely on innovation and creating new solutions to
problems. Example organic organizations might include small entrepreneurial firms and
technology start-ups. The larger an organization grows, the more oversight and supporting
roles (human resources, information technology, accounting, etc.) are needed. These larger
companies, like Google and Facebook, cannot operate truly organically but they incorporate
teams, information sharing, and empowerment to their advantage.
2.4 Our Approach and Other Considerations
Organization theory scholars and researchers strive to better model and understand orga-
nizational design, strategy, and leadership. The majority of work in this field is primarily
qualitative because the nature of the concepts lend themselves poorly to quantitative dis-
cussions. This research establishes a foundation for such quantitative discussions in the
form of a framework for measuring an organization’s architecture’s goodness-of-fit with
its environment. To do this, we develop a framework in the form of a simple game that
imitates the basic processes of an organization (gather, filter, assemble, deliver). Opera-
tions research tools allow us to explore OT from a new perspective and provide credibility
to our simulation findings. Our effort to design a quantitative measure of organizational
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architecture goodness-of-fit is a first step that we hope will support future work in viewing
OT from a fresh, technical perspective.
For completeness, belowwe brieflymention three other perspectives relevant to our research
that we explored and but ultimately discarded.
2.4.1 Computational Organization Theory
The field of Computational Organization Theory (COT) “focuses on theorizing about,
describing, understanding, and predicting the behavior of organizations and the process of
organizing” (Carley andWallace, 2001). COT researchers use models to describe a range of
organizational characteristics as well as to understand real-world observations. Dozens of
computational models have been developed including DYCORP and OrgAhead (Ashworth
and Carley, 2007).
Lin and Carley (1995) created the DYnamic Computational ORganizational Performance
(DYCORP) framework that contrasts organizations with different designs and operating
environments. Its purpose is to analyze four design elements: organizational structure,
resource access structure, organizational procedures, and agent style. These elements
are variable in order to simulate different organizational stresses. “Using this framework
the researcher can generate a series of precise, and therefore refutable, predictions about
the relationships among design, task, stress, and performance” (Lin and Carley, 1995).
Unfortunately, DYCORP is designed to only examine four specific organizational structures
and therefore is not suitable for our research objectives.
OrgAhead is another computational framework that models organizational learning and
decision-making. It “is used to test various aspects of real life organizations, such as
complexity in the task environment and constraints on structure and adaptability” (Lee
and Carley, 2004). OrgAhead can only consider organizations with hierarchical structures
and uses a Monte-Carlo style simulation which “evolves” the organizational structure using
random perturbations to find an “optimal” solution (Lee and Carley, 2004). Measuring
only hierarchical organizational structures limits the relevance of OrgAhead to our research
objectives and therefore it was not used.
17
2.4.2 Network Science
Network Science spans multiple fields of study, including mathematics (through graph
theory), sociology (through social networks), computer science (through algorithms for ex-
ploring networks), and engineering (through infrastructural networks); see Barabási (2016).
Network science lends itself well for modeling organizational architectures and measuring
characteristics (size, degree, density, connectedness, etc.) but not representing the com-
plexities of organizational architectures as Albert’s three dimensions describe. Alderson
(2008) summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of a network science perspective for
the study of complex systems, as viewed from the lens of operations research. Despite its
multi-disciplinary nature which offers a variety of perspectives we omit network science
discussions from our research.
2.4.3 The OODA Loop
Another perspective for understanding C2 is to consider it as a decision making process.
First presented in 1981 by Colonel John Boyd at the AirWar College and discussed in Power
to the Edge by (Alberts and Hayes, 2003), the military C2 process incorporates the four
fundamental functions of Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. Popularly called the “OODA
Loop,” its four steps are a simple representation of the decision making cycle used at all
levels of C2. Its simplicity resulted in its fast adoption across military forces.
Simple models commonly trade tractability for accuracy. The OODA Loop’s four functions
lack necessary detail in order for it to be an effective analytic tool. Efforts to make Boyd’s
work more descriptive include the work of Breton and Rousseau (2006) who propose
a modular version (“M-OODA”) that expands the “iterative and dynamic notions with
feedback and feed-forward [loops]” (Breton and Rousseau, 2006). In 2008 they develop the
Cognitive-OODA (“C-OODA”) loop which enhances the previous model by “increasing its
level of cognitive granularity” (Breton, 2008).
The variety of alternative models is evidence that no single decision making model can
successfully capture the complex nature of C2.
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2.5 Team of Teams —A Closer Look
In Iraq in 2003, the highly trained and well equipped JSOTF was unable to defeat the
lesser equipped and trained AQI forces. In his book Team of Teams, retired Army General
McChrystal describes the difficulties his task force faced as a result of having a traditional
military architecture (McChrystal et al., 2015). The JSOTF was unable to anticipate and
be pro-active in preventing AQI attacks as a result of the enemy’s unpredictability and fast
pace. Instead, the architecture restricted McChrystal’s forces to a reactive posture.
Table 2.1 highlights characteristics of JSOTF and AQI from an OT perspective.
Table 2.1. Contrast of JSOTF and AQI. (Adapted from Daft, 2012)
JSOTF (Mechanistic) AQI (Organic)
Centralized Structure Decentralized Structure
Strict Hierarchy of Authority Collaborative Teamwork
Specialized Tasks Empowered Roles
Vertical Communication Horizontal Communication
Many Rules, Formalized Few Rules, Informal
After realizing his task force’s fundamentally mechanistic architecture was ineffective
against its unpredictable and agile enemy, McChrystal restructured the JSOTF’s archi-
tecture and culture using concepts learned from netwar. Developed by John Arquilla and
David Ronfeldt, netwar, “refers to an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal
levels, short of traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms of
organization and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information
age” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001). In its battle against AQI, the JSOTF had to first learn
about its enemy’s architecture. According to Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), non-state actors
and terrorists like AQI, benefit from “numerous dispersed small groups using the latest
communications technologies [that can] act conjointly across great distances.”
Netwar organizations like AQI, are a network of highly connected and motivated fighters.
“The organizational design is flat. . . there is no single, central leadership, command, or
headquarters - no precise heart or head that can be targeted” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001).
Such organizations have advantages over hierarchies because decision making authority is
decentralized, thus allowing for “local initiative and autonomy” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt,
2001). Using the proposition, “It takes networks to fight networks” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt,
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2001) and key traits of netwar, McChrystal reorganized his forces in the following ways.
1. Teams: McChrystal disbanded traditional military departmentalization and reorga-
nized into cross-business teams. This structure supported creativity, communication,
and accountability. Boundaries or procedures which disrupted or prevented commu-
nication and collaboration between teams were identified and removed.
2. Information Sharing: McChrystal consolidated multiple communication networks
and demanded information be available throughout his task force. No person or
team in the task force can retain specialized information. He insisted on full trans-
parency and to this end conducted an Operations and Intelligence (O&I) briefing six
times weekly to push command guidance and actionable intelligence to the edges
of the task force with great speed and accuracy. By doing so, McChrystal created
a “shared consciousness” which supports adaptability in fighting an unpredictable
enemy (McChrystal et al., 2015).
3. LiaisonOfficers: Fundamental toMcChrystal’s new task force structure are embedded
liaison officers. Representatives from other organizations enhance collaboration
and cooperation. Previous to McChrystal, the task force’s level of interaction and
cooperation with other government agencies (i.e. CIA and NSA) did little to aid
either organization (McChrystal et al., 2015). By carefully selecting quality liaison
officers, McChrystal increased inter-agency trust, transparency, and cooperation.
4. EmpoweredExecution: To combat a fast paced enemy, leadershipmustmake decisions
in a timely manner. Instead of trying to control each decision in his task force,
McChrystal empowered those “individuals and teams closest to the problem, armed
with unprecedented levels of insights from across the network” with the “ability
to decide and act decisively” (McChrystal et al., 2015). McChrystal ensured this
decentralized decision-making culture supported the task force’s goals by clearly
communication Commander’s Intent during O&I briefings (McChrystal et al., 2015).
Bymaking the necessary changes to create a shared consciousness, extreme transparency, ef-
fective communication forums, and empowered execution, McChrystal’s task force became
a “team of teams.” The new flatter, networked, and team-oriented architecture reflected
“an organization within which the relationships between constituent teams resembled those
between individuals on a single team” (McChrystal et al., 2015) and embodied netwar
characteristics to better understand and combat AQI.
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2.6 Why this Research?
In support of quantitatively telling the Team of Teams story from an operations research
perspective, this research establishes a foundation for such quantitative discussions for
measuring an organization’s architecture’s goodness-of-fit with its environment. To do so,
we develop a framework for measuring how well an organizational architecture performs
in a known environment while accomplishing a known objective. This framework, in the
form of a simple game, imitates the basic processes of an organization and gives us a means
to simulate various C2 architectures and contrast their performance. Using mathematical
analysis, simulation, and Albert’s three dimensions of organizational architecture we will
explain why the JSOTF architecture originally failed against AQI and why McChrystal’s
organic “team of teams” concept was a better fit for its environment.
21




3.1 Let’s Play a Game
We seek a framework to quantitatively measure how well an organization’s architecture
achieves its mission in a given environment. As a first-principles approach to creating
such a measurement construct, we seek a design which mimics organizational processes
and yet is simple enough to explain and support mathematical analysis. The measurement
framework we present is in the form of a game.
3.1.1 What is a Game?
According to Fullerton (2014), games contain five major elements:
Components. These are players and the objects in the game with which players interact.
Components of board games are commonly dice or cards, whereas in football they are team
members and the ball.
Space. The "world" in which the game is played. The space of board games like Monopoly
are specifically designed boards, whereas the space of football is the playing field.
Goals. The objective the player(s) strive to achieve. Goals define what it means to win. In
Monopoly, the objective is financial dominance, whereas in football both teams strive to
accrue maximum points.
Mechanics. These are the actions players can do, or have done to them. During game-play,
mechanics constrain player actions or movement, often to add difficulty to the game. In
Monopoly, rolling dice determines which property a player moves to. In football, each team
has four “downs” to advance a minimum of 10 yards.
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Rules. The constraints which guide a player’s decision making. Rules describe how the
game is played and what actions are allowed to be taken in order to win. In Monopoly, a
player can buy an available property or perhaps force rent to be paid if it is already owned.
In football, penalties for rule violations ensure fair play (e.g., holding, pass interference)
and player safety (e.g., roughing the kicker, targeting, and clipping).
3.1.2 Game Design Requirements
We seek a game: 1) That mimics the organizational processes of gathering, filtering, assem-
bling, and delivering, 2) That can be played by a single player, 3) In which an organization
with additional players should perform better, 4) In which interactions and communication
between players can be manipulated to represent varying types of organizational architec-
tures, and 5) That can be played in different environments and with varying objectives.
Using Fullerton’s five game elements, we describe the characteristics we seek for a game
that can be used to quantify an organization’s effectiveness under various circumstances.
Components. The components of our game are the players, who represent the members in
an organization, and resources the players use.
Space. Our game’s space is not associated with a geographic location, specialized game
board, or type of playing field. In terms of our game, space represents an organization’s
operating environment. “Organizational environment is defined as everything that exists
outside the boundary of the organization and has the potential to affect all or part of
the organization” (Daft, 2001). The environment also incorporates an important temporal
element (according toMorgan, 2006) which is its “degree of stability or change”. We require
the ability to change the environment simulated in our game in order to test architecture
performance under varying circumstances.
Goals. The goal of our game is for an organization to complete a specific objective. We
wish to measure an architecture’s performance in completing its objective by recording the
time it takes to do so.
Mechanics. The game’s mechanics define who can communicate/collaborate with who
and formal reporting relationships between members. These define the organizational
architecture being examined.
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Rules.We require a game with rules that represent simple ‘if-then’ player decisions. Avoid-
ing complex decision making situations keeps the game understandable and supports math-
ematical tractability. Game rules are adjustable to control player actions in support of
modeling various organizational architectures.
3.2 Choosing the “Correct” Game
Using these design attributes we originally sought to find an existing, recognizable game
to serve as the basis of our framework. Choosing a pre-existing and familiar game helps
prevent confusion and avoid more lengthy discussions. In our search, we considered the
following potential games for exploration.
Candidate 1: Memory
The childhood memorization game “Memory” inspired our first design iteration. In this
game, n number of cards (consisting of n2 number of pairs) are placed face down randomly
in a grid. During each turn, a player selects two cards in attempt to match the second card
with the first. If the two cards do not match they are returned face down to their original
positions. When a match is made, the two cards are removed thus reducing the remaining
number of cards. The goal of the game is to assemble as many matches as possible. This
game is attractive because it is feasible to scale up the game and number of players but the
complexities of simulating player memory and the possibility for involving partial matches
led us to rule out this game.
Candidate 2: Bingo
The second game we examined is “Bingo.” In this game, the player or players receive
numbers randomly from a distribution and must match them to a game board. This game
supports complete matches but complications arise with the variations of how a game can
end (e.g., matching a row vs. column). Additionally, we saw no added benefit beyond a
linear increase in performance when playing with more than one player. For these reasons
we continued our search elsewhere.
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Candidate 3: Number Matching
A hypothetical number matching game was our next attempt. In this game, the player
or players receive numbers randomly and they attempt to match these numbers with a
“target sequence” (of numbers). This game received no additional consideration because
we perceived no increase in performance from having any architecture more elaborate than
a simple two layer hierarchy. Attempts to add extra rules and constraints to make the game
more challenging was avoided because adding unnecessary complexities can be considered
by readers as intentionally contrived in order to achieve a desired research outcome.
Candidate 4: “Fishing”
A modification to the mechanics of Candidate 3 was examined in which players had dif-
ferent probabilities of receiving random numbers from a distribution. The intent of this
modification was to model organizational workers with different levels of skill and expe-
rience. A senior, more skilled worker could “fish” for numbers within the environment
with greater success that a junior, less skilled worker. This modification added unnecessary
mathematical complications and was not supportive of our research objectives.
3.3 Our Game: Word Matching
The chosen framework for our research simulation is a word matching game. Using
Fullerton’s lexicon we present the game’s characteristics:
Components. The components of the game are simply the players and resources available
to each player. Each player represents one member in an organization.
Space. The resources come from the game’s space (an organization’s environment) which
we implement using a distribution of letters A through Z. During every turn, each player
receives one letter from the distribution which we can vary, thus changing the organizational
environment in which we examine the performance of a specific architecture.
Goals. The overall goal of the game is for an organization to collect and assemble the
required letters to match a specific objective. The objective can be partitioned into small
tasks and assigned to specific members in the organization. Each player is assigned a
primary (and possibly a secondary) task which they strive to accomplish using the letters
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they receive. Like the environment, we can vary the organization’s objective in order to
measure an architecture’s performance under different stresses.
Mechanics. The game’s mechanics are defined by the specific organizational architecture
being examined. Each architecture will have different connections between members,
reporting relationships, and collaborative processes. We can change the game’s mechanics
in order to analyze different architectures.
Rules. Game rules direct player actions. They dictate what each player will do each turn
according to the architecture being examined. The number of discrete simulation time steps
it takes the organization to match its objective is the output (score) of the game.
3.4 Example Game Play
Next, we demonstrate how the word matching game is played and how the game measures
the performance of an organizational architecture. For this example we examine the simplest
possible architecture; a single person playing the game. This player’s objective is the word
“TEACH.” Figure 3.1 illustrates this player receiving letters from the distribution one at a
time. When a T, E, A, C, or H is received, the player retains the letter, otherwise the letter
is discarded. The player continues receiving letters from the environment and repeats the
filtering action. Once the player has enough of each letter to match the objective word, the
player does so, thus completing organization’s objective, and ending the game.
Figure 3.1. Single Person Architecture
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3.5 Architectures to be Studied
Next, we identify the organizational architectures we seek to explore via mathematical
analysis and simulation in Chapter 4. Our goal is to understand how resilient an architecture
is to changes in the organization’s objective and/or environment. Before presenting the
architectures we must clarify our terminology:
Worker. A worker is a player in the game that receives an input of letters from the environ-
ment (distribution of letters). We illustrate workers using a red rectangle. Each is assigned
a task (sub-component of the organization’s overall objective), annotated in the rectangle.
Workers can only communicate or collaborate with other players if connected by a linkage
in the architecture. Workers have no subordinates.
Manager. Amanager is a player in the game connected to one or more subordinate workers.
Managers are illustrated with blue rectangles and do not receive an input of letters from the
environment. The manager’s task is to collect completed tasks from workers and match the
organization’s overall objective, depicted in the rectangle.
Using this lexicon and the word matching game, we present the architectures we will
examine in our analysis:
3.5.1 Single Worker
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, a one person organization has the simplest architecture possible.
This is our base case from which we begin our analysis.
3.5.2 Two Workers Playing Independently
The next architecture we consider consists of two workers who cannot communicate or
collaborate in any way while playing the game. Each worker has the same task but the
organization’s objective is satisfied when either player matches it completely. Each worker
receives letters independently and chosen randomly from the distribution. This architecture
is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2. Two Workers Playing Independently
3.5.3 Two Workers Cooperating
Next, we examine an architecture which allows two workers to play while sharing letters.
Unlike two independent players, this organization’s objective is completewhen the collective
letters of both players are sufficient to match the assigned objective. As shown in Figure
3.3, this architecture connects two workers allowing them to play the game cooperatively.
Figure 3.3. Two Workers Playing Together
3.5.4 Simple Hierarchy
We next consider a simple hierarchy consisting of two workers who are connected by a
manager. This architecture partitions the organization’s objective into smaller tasks. As
illustrated in Figure 3.4, one manager collects completed tasks from the two workers in
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order to match the organization’s overall objective. Additionally, the manager can distribute
unused letters to other players if needed.
NOTE: Beginning with Figure 3.4 all illustrations will show only the organizational archi-
tecture and omit any graphics representing the distribution of letters (environment).
Figure 3.4. Example Simple Hierarchy
3.5.5 Larger Hierarchy
We consider next, larger hierarchies and explore why this architecture is well-suited for
organization’s with singular objectives and that operate in a stable environment. Organiza-
tions with mechanistic-style hierarchies (as depicted in Figure 3.5) focus on efficiency as
their measure of performance. We show that efficiency is obtained at a cost of robustness
and flexibility to change.
Figure 3.5. Example Larger Hierarchy
3.5.6 Teams
Team architectures are the fundamental element of Contingency Theory. Teams consist of
multiple members in an organization who collaborate to complete a given task or objective.
As illustrated in Figure 3.6, team architectures foster creative thinking and innovation
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because the denser number of connections between team members support communication
and information sharing. Organizations utilizing team architectures are characterized by
flexibility and robustness to changes in the organization’s objective or environment.
Figure 3.6. Example Team Architecture
3.5.7 Team of Teams
As teams grow larger the number of connections between members can increase rapidly.
Since communication and collaboration has an associated burden on players, larger densely
connected organizations can reach a peak level of performance. To help tell the story
of McChrystal’s Team of Teams, we consider architectures which connect multiple teams
together as illustrated in Figure 3.7. Since it is not feasible in large organizations for every
member to connect with every other member, teams assigned to specific tasks are connected
to other teams.
In Chapter 4 we mathematically analyze the more simple architectures discussed in this
section. We use this analysis to predict the performance of these architectures when tested
using our word matching game simulation. We start with our base case architecture and
then incrementally add complexity.
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In this chapter, we use a Discrete-Time Markov Chain as a mathematical framework to
support analysis of our word matching game. Specifically, we represent play in any specific
game as a series of random transitions from one state to another, starting with an initial
state and concluding when the system reaches a terminal (or trapping) state. At every point
in the game, we assume the probability of the next transition depends only on the current
state (i.e., the process is memoryless). Time advances in discrete steps and the state space
for the game is the set of all possible states.
4.1.1 Notation and Mathematical Setup
Let S represent the state space of the system, assuming without loss of generality that there
are |S| = n total states. We partition the set S into two subsets, where, T ⊂ S is the set of
transitive states, andU ⊂ S is the set of trapping states, with T ∩U = ∅ and T ∪U = S.




1, 2, ...,m︸      ︷︷      ︸
transitive
,m + 1, ..., n
}︸        ︷︷        ︸
trapping
.
Let P be the associated transition matrix of the system, where elements Pi j represent the
probability of transitioning from state i to state j. Given the assumed ordering above, we







Here, the submatrix T represents the transitions between transitive states, and the submatrix
T0 represents transitions from transitive to trapping states. By construction, there are no
transitions from trapping states to transitive states, and once in a trapping state, the system
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stays there permanently.
Let τi represent the expected number of transitions from state i until arriving in a trapping
state. We wish to calculate values for τ1, τ2, . . . , τm (note, τm+1, . . . , τn are each equal to































where T is a matrix of size m × m.
In order to use this framework for our word matching game, we define the state space in
terms of the number of letters that have been obtained. The transitions between states
depend in general on the number of players and connections between them as determined
by the architecture being examined. Specific examples follow. However, in general we
measure the performance of a given architecture for a game in terms of the expected time
(number of discrete simulation steps) to complete a task, which translates directly to the
value of τ for some initial state.
4.1.2 Simulation
We complement our mathematical analysis of the word matching game using aMonte-Carlo
style simulation coded in the Python programming language (Rossum and Drake, 2003). A
single run of the simulation returns the time for the organization to complete its objective.
For each architecture of interest, we run the simulation 10,000 times and calculate the
sample mean plus or minus a 95% confidence interval half-width. Below we discuss the
simulation using the lexicon of Fullerton (2014).
Components
We define a Python class-object called Agent to represent workers and managers in an
organization. Every agent is assigned a primary task and has an optional secondary task.
For a worker, a primary task could be a letter, word, or letter sequence that they must match.
A manager’s primary task is to assemble components provided by workers to match the
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organization’s objective. Secondary tasks are assigned according to the architecture being
examined (e.g., to share letters needed by other workers). Each agent has a queue from
which they get their next letter or item. Depending on the architecture being measured,
a worker’s queue is populated with letters that are either sampled from the distribution or
shared by other workers. The manager’s queue can contain components of the objective that
were matched by workers or unused letters to share with other workers. In each discrete step
of the simulation, the number of items an agent can process is limited by the work capacity
for that respective type of agent. We consider the specific case where a worker can process
only one item from their queue, whereas a manager can process two items. Additionally,
every agent has a WorkSpace in which letters needed for the primary are retained, until
they are removed after a successful match is made.
Space
Wedefine the space or environment of the game by a distribution of letters. During each turn
every worker receives one random letter from the distribution. The first letter distribution
we present is directly proportionate with the frequency of letters found in 40,000 words
from the English dictionary (Cornell Department of Mathematics, 2004). The frequency
of each letter divided by the sum of all letters yields each letter’s probability. Appendix B
lists the frequency and probability for each letter in the Cornell letter distribution.
Goals
The organization’s objective can be a single letter, sequence of letters, or word. Each run
of the simulation terminates when the organization obtains the minimum quantity of letters
needed to match the objective.
Mechanics
The simulation tests how well a specific organizational architecture performs in completing
a given objective within a specified environment. An architecture is defined in terms of
the connections between agents. We represent the connections for each Agent in terms of
three lists (Parents, Children, and Peers) which define its position and connectivity within
an organization. An agent’s ParentsList defines “vertical” connections with agents who
are superior, if applicable. Similarly, the ChildrenList connects agents with subordinate
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agents who are lower in the organization’s hierarchy. The PeersList connects agents
“horizontally” to other agents according to the architecture being examined.
Rules
The rules of the simulation determine agent actions. When a worker receives a letter that
is needed for the primary then the worker adds it to the WorkSpace. Depending on the
architecture being examined, non-matching letters are discarded or shared. Information
sharing within an organization can be represented by sharing duplicate or unneeded letters
with other workers (if they are connected) or via a manager.
We implement the Monte-Carlo style simulation using the following logic:
initialize time = 0
while not objective_matched:
for each worker_agent:
sample letter from distribution; add to queue
pop letter from queue
process letter
for each manager_agent:
for each turn in work_capacity:




We repeat this simulation 10,000 times and calculate the sample mean and sample 95%
confidence interval half-width.
4.2 Single Player
The first architecture we analyze is our base case, comprised of only one worker who must
match an objective (letter, word, or an assigned sequence of letters). In this section we
present mathematical analysis of the base case to set the stage for more complicated work
in later sections.
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4.2.1 Matching a Single Letter
First, we consider an elementary example in which a worker’s primary task is to match only
a single letter, the letter “A”.We represent our state space using a single elementSA ∈ {0, 1}
where 0 represents the state where the letter “A” has not yet been matched, and 1 represents
the state when the letter “A” has been matched. Figure 4.1 illustrates the Markov-Chain
for the base case. The worker begins in state SA = 0. The worker remains in state 0 until
an “A” is received. Using the Cornell letter distribution, the probability the next letter the
worker receives is an “A” (P0,1) is PA = 0.08124. The probability the worker remains in
state SA = 0 is P0,0 = 1 − P0,1 = 0.91876.
Figure 4.1. Markov Chain of Single Player Matching Single Letter





be the expected number of letters (equivalently, time steps) the worker should see
on average before completing the primary task, if starting at state SA = 0. In this simple





























































This simple result is intuitive because system transitions are governed by a Bernoulli random
variable. Each letter the agent receives can only move the system into two possible states:
1) the letter did not match the objective, or 2) the letter matched the objective. Like flipping
a coin, the agent’s objective is complete as soon as the first match is made, otherwise the
system continues.
Using our Python implementation of the word matching game, we simulate a single worker
(base case) architecture with three different single letter primary tasks. Table 4.1 compares
calculated answers (using Equation 4.3) with simulation results.
Table 4.1. Single Worker, Single Letter Calculated Results vs. Simulated
Task: Px: Calculated Value: Simulated Value:
A PA = 0.08124 12.3095 12.3797 ± 0.2291
B PB = 0.01489 67.1466 67.2827 ± 1.3052
C PC = 0.02711 36.8810 36.9857 ± 0.7132
By beginning our analysis with the simplest architecture and confirming the mathematical
analysis and simulation results match, we verify our setup, thus establishing a foundation
which we will incrementally build upon to examine more advanced architectures.
4.2.2 Matching Multiple Letters
Now lets assume a single worker’s task is to match the two letter sequence “AB.” Figure 4.2
shows the Markov-Chain for this case. The state space is now defined by a pair of values
(SA, SB) where SA ∈ {0, 1} and SB ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, the number of states has increased from
two to four.
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Figure 4.2. Markov Chain of Single Worker with Task “AB”
























































































































We simulated a single worker with three different two letter tasks. Table 4.2 supports the
analytic calculations shown above.
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Table 4.2. Single Worker, Multiple Letter Calculated Results vs. Simulated
Task: Calculated Value: Simulated Value:
AB 69.0536 68.7626 ± 1.2761
SC 41.6819 41.8585 ± 0.6780
JL 970.3319 969.9242 ± 18.7888
The mathematical calculations and simulation results in Section 4.2 are consistent, thus
supporting the accuracy of the word matching game simulation as a measurement construct
for more complicated organizational architectures as we continue research.
4.3 Multiple Independent Players
In this section, we examine the performance of organizational architectures with two or
more workers who operate independently to achieve identical primary tasks (as illustrated in
Figure 3.2). Workers play the game in parallel and without any interaction, communication,
or coordination. The organization’s objective is met as soon as one of the multiple workers
completes the assigned primary task.
4.3.1 Matching a Single Letter
Figure 4.3 shows a Markov-Chain for two workers, each with the same primary task (match
“A”). We denote the state space now by (S1, S2), where S1 ∈ {0, 1} and S2 ∈ {0, 1}
indicate whether Worker 1 or Worker 2, respectively, has matched the letter. State (0,0)
is the starting state, and states (1,0), (0,1) and (1,1) are all absorbing states because the
organization’s objective is complete as soon as either worker gets their first “A” or in the
case where both workers get an “A” on the same turn.










































Figure 4.3. Markov Chain of Two Workers with Same Single Letter Task























1 − (1 − PA)k
. (4.6)
Using the word matching game simulation we measure the performance of the architectures
with two or more workers who work independently to accomplish their task. Table 4.3
shows the calculated expected values using Equation 4.6 compared to simulation outputs.
The results support the common sense notion that two or more workers should complete a
single letter primary task faster than one.
Table 4.3. Results of Multiple Independent Workers with Task = “A”
# of Workers: 1 2 3 4
Calculated: 12.3092 6.4152 4.4552 3.4787
Simulated: 12.3797 ± 0.2291 6.3986 ± 0.1150 4.5630 ± 0.0810 3.4597 ± 0.0573
4.3.2 Two Players, Matching Multiple Letters
Next, we increase the difficulty of the primary task from a single letter to two letters. This
increases the state space from four to 16 because we must use four digits to keep track of
system states. To do so, we let Ski = state of player k on letter i. If the organization has two








B). For example, S0,1,0,0 represents
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the system state in which worker #1 has matched a “B” but not an “A,” and worker #2 has
matched neither. Using this notation, Table 4.4 is the transition submatrix T of matrix P.
We solve the system of equations defined byT using the statistical computing language R (R




= T1 = 36.4587. This analytic result is consistent
with the simulation output for this architecture, equal to 36.6198 ± 0.6240.
As the number of workers or size of the objective increase, the size and complexity of
an organization’s transition matrix can very quickly become too complicated to manually
produce. As shown in Table 4.4, two workers with a two letter primary task requires a
system with 16 states. For each additional worker or letter added to the organization or
primary task, respectively, the system’s state space doubles. For example, the dimensions
of the P matrix for an architecture with three independent workers each with task “ABC”
is 64 x 64. Setting up the transition matrix becomes tedious as organizations grow beyond
trivial sizes. For this reason, when examining more complicated architectures in subsequent
sections we rely more heavily on simulation analysis.
The simulation outputs in Table 4.6 show the impact of adding more independent workers
to an architecture with objective “AB.” The results are intuitive. With more workers, the
expected time to complete the task decreases. However, if all that matters is completing
this task once, then any partial progress of the other workers is wasted. One way to mitigate
this wasted work is for the workers to coordinate their activities to work together instead of
independently. Next, we explore architectures with connections between workers that allow
communication or cooperation.
Table 4.6. Simulation Results of Independent Workers with Task = “AB”
# of Workers: 2 3 4

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.4 Multiple Cooperating Players
We now examine the performance of architectures with two or more workers who are
connected and can cooperate to complete the organization’s objective. In these architectures,
workers receive letters by sampling independently from the distribution, but can use letters
shared by other workers. In terms of our word matching game simulation, we implement
the sharing of letters in this section by simply combining each agent’s WorkSpace list
into one. In other words, when one worker matches an “A,” all workers have an “A” in
their WorkSpace. The architecture matches its objective when the combined WorkSpace
contains the required letters. We use this over-simplified letter sharing rule in this section
only until we introduce the concept of costs associated with cooperation.
4.4.1 Matching a Single Letter
Recall the two-person architecture (illustrated in Figure 3.3) where two workers are con-
nected and can share letters they receive. Let the architecture’s objective be to match “A.”
In the case where there are no cooperation costs for players to share letters (more on this
below), then this architecture will perform equivalently to two independent (non-connected)
workers. This is because, for either architecture, its system ends as soon as any worker gets
an “A.” This means that for a single letter objective, the expected performance for two or
more independent workers (Equation 4.6) is the same as two or more cooperating workers.
Using the word matching simulation we confirmed that both systems performed equally.
Only in the case of single letter objectives does the expected value of k independent workers
equal k cooperating workers. As soon as an organization’s objective is larger than a single
letter, the advantage of cooperation between multiple workers is observable.
4.4.2 Matching Multiple Letters
As an organization’s objective grows in size, cooperation among workers improves orga-
nizational performance. Consider the instance of two workers who cooperate to match a







Table 4.5 displays the submatrix T for two cooperating workers with primary task of “AB.”
Compared to Table 4.4, the new transition submatrix is smaller because the system repre-
senting two cooperating workers has two additional trapping states. Specifically, because a
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trapping state is reached as soon as a minimum of one “A” and one “B” are matched by the
two workers, the states (0,1,1,0) and (1,0,0,1) are now trapping states.





= T1 = 34.7854. This is consistent with our simulation results for two
cooperating players of 34.8019 ± 0.6404, thus supporting our statement that cooperation
among workers improves performance.
To examine the performance of more than two cooperating workers, we rely on simulation.
Table 4.7 shows a marked improvement in an organization’s performance when its architec-
ture connects workers, thus allowing cooperation. We show that adding more cooperating
workers improves an organization’s performance, but does the same statement remain true
with larger numbers of workers? In the real-world, organizations have restraints on the size
of their workforce and rarely can every worker be connected and cooperate. This is because
cooperation comes at a cost to the organization.
Table 4.7. Simulation Results of Cooperating Workers with Task = “AB”
# of Workers: 2 3 4
Expected Value: 34.8019 ± 0.6404 23.2637 ± 0.4259 17.7431 ± 0.3175
Introducing Costs of Cooperation.
Cooperation can only occur between workers who are connected. In the real-world, these
connections represent communications paths, interaction processes, or any formal means in
which workers communicate. Unfortunately, time spent communicating is less time spent
working toward accomplishing an assigned task. Stated differently, cooperation comes at a
cost or expense to the organization’s performance.
An organization with workers who are not connected does not spend time communicating
(because they can’t) and those workers have zero costs associated with cooperation. Un-
fortunately, a disconnected architecture fails to benefit from the performance advantages
gained when workers are connected and cooperate. At the other extreme, an organization
in which every worker is connected to every other worker has total sharing across the work-
force. In this architecture, performance can suffer if workers are so overwhelmed sharing
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and receiving information that they can’t perform their assigned duties.
We present Figure 4.4 to demonstrate the cost of cooperation even in a very small organiza-
tion. The depicted architecture shows two workers who are connected and can share letters
in order to match the organization’s objective of “AB.” Worker 1 has the primary task of
matching “A” and the secondary task of sharing “B.” Worker 2’s tasks are opposite.
Figure 4.4. Two Connected Workers with Different Primary and Secondary
Tasks
Each worker only gets one letter per simulation time-step. The letter is either a new letter
from the distribution or it is a letter that was shared by the other worker. This means that
by receiving and matching a shared letter, that worker is not exposed to a new letter from
the distribution on that turn. For example, if Worker 2 gets an “A” then it is shared with
Worker 1, who will use it instead of a fresh letter on the following simulation time-step.
Given the architecture shown in Figure 4.4 and the frequency of “A” compared to “B” in the
Cornell letter distribution, we expect Worker 2 to more frequently share an “A” with Worker
1 thanWorker 1 will share a “B”withWorker 2. This means thatWorker 1 will receive fewer
new letters from the distribution thereby reducing the number of chances to get the rarer letter
(“B”), thus decreasing the overall performance of the organization. Using ourwordmatching









= 34.8019 ± 0.6404 shown in Table 4.7.
Consider possible simulation results if repeated for larger organizations of 3, 4, or more
fully connected workers. If a worker who is connected to multiple other workers receives a
letter that is to be shared, to whom do they send it? When this happens in such architectures,
now the worker must face a choice. The worker must choose which other worker to share the
letter with and the organization’s overall performance potentially depends on their decision.
Inconsistencies in that decision can potentially result in inconsistent performance. Further-
more, figuring out how to make that decision takes time away from work the worker might
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otherwise be doing (receiving and attempting to match new letters from the distribution).
A simple solution to this situation is to connect the worker to only a single person to whom
they share the letter (i.e, the manager), like in a hierarchy. This keeps the worker’s job
simpler, and ensures consistency.
Before exploring architecture types like hierarchies that take advantage of selectively con-
necting workers, we emphasize that all results previous to this subsection do not consider
costs associated with cooperation. The next section will explore trivial hierarchies and
continue to ignore the concept of cooperation having an associated cost until we reintroduce
it in Section 4.6.
4.5 Hierarchies
Hierarchical structures are common in organizations because they define positional relation-
ships amongmembers and break larger organizational objectives into separate or specialized
tasks. They are often characterized by architectures in which large objectives are broken
down into smaller tasks that can be accomplished efficiently.
We begin our discussion of hierarchies with a base case hierarchical architecture consisting
of one manager and two workers, as shown in Figure 3.4. We examine this architecture
first by assigning it the objective “AB” in order to compare its performance with previously
discussed architectures. In this base case hierarchy, one worker is assigned the task of
matching “A” and the other worker “B.” The organization achieves its objective when the
manager has received at least one “A” and one “B.”
In this hierarchy, the manager’s only action is to receive completed tasks from subordinates.
Later, in Section 4.5.2 we examine a modification in which the manager can share letters
among workers.
4.5.1 Base Case Hierarchy - One Way Vertical Communication
Let the pair of values (SA,SB) define the state space, where SA ∈ {0, 1} and SB ∈ {0, 1}.
Each value in the pair is 0 or 1, representing the presence or absence of a letter match at the
manager’s level at that state space, respectively. Figure 4.5 illustrates the Markov-Chain for
the base case hierarchy. From the view of the manager, the system begins in state S00. If the
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worker assigned the task of matching “A” gets one, then the worker passes it to the manager
and the state of the system transitions to S10. In the case that during a single simulation
time-step both workers get their assigned letter, then the system moves directly to S11.
Figure 4.5. Markov Chain of Hierarchy with One Manager and Two Workers








































































(PA)2(−PB) + (PA)2 − PA(PB)2 + PAPB + (PB)2
PAPB (PA(−PB) + PA + PB)
. (4.7)
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(PA)2(−PB) + (PA)2 − PA(PB)2 + PAPB + (PB)2
PAPB (PA(−PB) + PA + PB)
=
(0.08124)2(−0.01489) + (0.08124)2 − 0.08124(0.01489)2 + 0.0012 + (0.01489)2
0.0012(0.08124(−0.01489) + 0.08124 + 0.01489)
= 68.9332.
We mathematically calculate the expected number of time-steps needed for the base case
hierarchy to complete its objective to be 68.9332.
An alternative way to calculate the expected value is to solve the system of equations defined
by the transition submatrix T in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8. Transition Submatrix for One Manager, Two Worker Hierarchy
(0,0) (0,1) (1,0)
(0,0) (1 − Pa)(1 − Pb) Pb(1 − Pa) Pa (1 − Pb)
(0,1) 1 − Pa
(1,0) 1 − Pb




= 68.9332. Both mathe-
matical methods support our word matching game simulation, which resulted in an expected
value of 69.3888 ± 1.2861.
If you recall the calculated and simulated results from Section 4.4.2, the base case hierar-
chy’s performance is nearly identical to the performance of an organizational architecture
consisting of a single worker with primary task “AB.” In the base case hierarchy, the man-
ager’s role is simply to collect completed tasks from workers, and therefore the manager
receives an “A” or “B” at nearly the same rate as one worker attempting to match “AB”
alone. The exception to this statement is the small chance that both workers receive their
exact matching letter at the same time (seen as the diagonal line in Figure 4.5). Due to
this unlikely but possible transition in the Markov-Chain, our mathematical calculations
confirm a very slight advantage favoring the base case hierarchy over the single worker
architecture discussed in Section 4.2.2 (68.9332 < 69.0536). Unfortunately, the advantage
is so small that due to the stochastic nature of the Monte-Carlo simulation, our result of
69.3888 ± 1.2861 has too wide a range to differentiate the two architectures. So why do
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companies and organizations often have hierarchical architectures? The benefits are easily
observable when we consider architectures with three or more workers.
We continue our incremental research approach by adding one more worker to our base
case hierarchy. As confirmed in previous sections, additional workers can improve an
organization’s overall performance. But in a hierarchy, the assignment of tasks to workers,
more than the number of workers added, has the greatest impact on an architecture’s
performance. Table 4.9 compares simulation results of two hierarchies with three workers
with the base case hierarchy. Both larger hierarchies show improved performance, but the
task assignment (“A” or “B”) of the newly added worker makes a tremendous difference.
Table 4.9. Simulation Results of One Way Hierarchies with Task = “AB”
Architecture:
Expected Value: 69.3888 ± 1.2861 67.1308 ± 1.3182 36.6723 ± 0.6139
The assignment of worker tasks in accomplishing a specific objective has significant impact
on performance. As Table 4.9 shows, if the organization’s objective is “AB” then having
two workers assigned to match “B” vastly outperforms an architecture with two workers
assigned “A.” In terms of our word matching simulation, knowing the particulars of the
Cornell letter distribution allows a keen manager to assign tasks to his/her workers in the
best manner. Since the probability of getting a “B” (0.01489) is smaller than getting an “A”
(0.08124), it makes sense to assignmore workers the more difficult task. If an organization’s
operating environment (letter distribution) is known, optimum worker task assignment is
possible. If more workers are added to an architecture, the operating environment changes,
or the organization’s objective changes, task assignments should be reevaluated or the
organization’s performance may suffer. When organizational architectures are designed
(and worker tasks assigned) around completing a specific objective while operating in a
known environment, performance can be optimized, but the organization’s robustness to
changing objectives or environments decreases. Next, we explore hierarchies with a more
advanced cooperation rule that increases performance and robustness.
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4.5.2 Base Case Modification - Two Way Vertical Communication
Next, we modify the base case hierarchy to allow the manager to share letters received from
one worker with other workers. For example, using our base case hierarchy with objective
“AB,” if the worker assigned to match “A” receives a “B” then that worker passes it up to the
manager who then passes it to the worker with task “B” on the next simulation time step.
We first measure the performance of a two worker, one manager hierarchy in which the
manager can share letters. Our simulation yields an expected value of 34.9463 ± 0.6484
which is nearly identical to the simulation results in Section 4.4.2 of 34.8019 ± 0.6404 for
two fully connected workers. The two architectures perform nearly identically except for
the slight advantage of the hierarchy in the case of both workers getting their exact matching
letter at the same time. Again, the advantage is so small that it falls within the simulation’s
95% confidence interval half width.
Table 4.10 shows simulation results for a two worker hierarchy and two versions of a three
worker hierarchy we explore next. In Section 4.5.1, when a third worker is added to the
base case hierarchy, performance improves but it varies based on which task the new worker
was assigned. We might expect the same result again but our simulation results show that
assigning either task to the new worker improves the organization’s performance nearly
equally. The reason for this is the manager can share letters received by workers who don’t
need them with a worker who does. Therefore, the three workers perform as if they are
fully-connected, but with fewer connections. Keeping the number of connections in an
architecture to a minimum is important in order to reduce unnecessary costs associated with
cooperation and communication.
Table 4.10. Simulation Results of Two Way Hierarchies with Task = “AB”
Architecture:
Expected Value: 34.9463 ± 0.6484 23.5521 ± 0.4289 23.6020 ± 0.4365
As introduced in Section 4.4.2, connections between agents in an architecture allow commu-
nication and cooperation to occur but have an associated cost. In the smaller architectureswe
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examine, the difference in number of connections between hierarchical and fully connected
architectures is minor, but in larger organizations the difference is significant.
Consider the two architectures (each with k workers) shown in Table 4.11. In the first
architecture, each of the k workers is connected to all the others. In the second, each of
the k workers is connected to a single manager. The first architecture, with k workers
connected to all the others has k (k − 1)/2 connections. The second architecture is a
hierarchy, consisting of one manager connected to k workers, and has only k connections.
Table 4.11. Comparison of Number of Connections Between Seven Worker
Hierarchy and Seven Fully-Connected Workers
k Workers, Fully-Connected Hierarchy with k Workers
Architecture:
# of Connections: k (k − 1)/2 k
k = 7 21 7
At low values of k, the difference in number of connections is small. But in larger organi-
zations, architectures can grow dense with connections quickly, thus negatively impacting
performance. Figure 4.6 demonstrates the exponential versus linear growth in the number
of connections between fully-connected and hierarchical architectures.
As the size of any organization increases, the number of connections will certainly increase.
Limiting extraneous connections will reduce costs associated with communication and
cooperation, thereby improving overall organizational performance. As we continue this
research, we examine the careful balance between reducing connections in order to increase
performance, with the impact on an architecture’s robustness to change.
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Figure 4.6. Graph Showing an Exponential Increase in Number of Connec-
tions in a Fully-Connected Architecture Vs. a Linear Increase in a Hierarchy
We present Table 4.12 to summarize the architectures we have examined. The bracketed
letter following each result annotates the method used to calculate the expected value.
A = Analytic equations and S = Simulation.
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Table 4.12. Architecture Performance Summary
1 Agent 2 Agents 3 Agents 4 Agents
Independent
Agents
69.0536 [A] 36.4587 [A] 26.3074 [A] 20.9992 [A]
68.7626 ± 1.2761 [S] 36.6198 ± 0.6240 [S] 25.8209 ± 0.4025 [S] 20.9587 ± 0.3104 [S]
We begin with the simplest
architecture consisting of one
agent.
Doubling the number of agents
reduces the expected value
nearly in half.
More agents yield better per-
formance, but benefit begins to
taper off.
Additional agents continue to
improve performance, but it




34.8019 ± 0.6404 [S] 23.2637 ± 0.4259 [S] 17.7431 ± 0.3175 [S]
Connecting two agents al-
lows them to share letters,
thus improving performance
compared to two independent
agents.
Connecting three agents con-
tinues to decrease the ex-
pected value. Realistically,
now sharing rules are needed
to avoid creating copies of let-
ters. Time deciding how to
share, is time an agent is not
matching new letters.
Using simple sharing rules,
additional agents result in im-
proved performance but the
rate of improvement slows.
Hierarchy
One-way Comms
69.3888 ± 1.2861 [S] A = 67.1308 ± 1.3182 [S]
B = 36.6723 ± 0.6139 [S]
With one-way communica-
tion, performance is nearly
identical as a single agent ar-
chitecture.
Assigning “A” or “B” to the
added worker makes a huge
difference. When the envi-
ronment is known, tasks can




34.9463 ± 0.6484[S] A = 23.5521 ± 0.4289 [S]
B = 23.6020 ± 0.4365 [S]
The expected value is nearly
same as two connected agents
since the manager can share
letters with other agents.
With two-way communica-
tion, the architecture’s sensi-
tivity to task assignments is
much less, thus making the ar-
chitecture more robust.
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4.5.3 Challenges Moving Forward
As introduced in Section 4.4.2, communication and cooperation between agents has as-
sociated costs to an organization’s overall performance. We model communication and
cooperation costs by giving agents a finite work capacity on each time step of the simula-
tion. In other words, we attempt to model real-life by limiting every worker and manager
to a maximum amount of work he or she is able to complete in a given time period. To
justify this concept, consider a simple hierarchy in which a single manager has infinite work
capacity. If this were the case, because the manager is connected to every worker and has no
work limit, the manager can share as many letters that are available across the architecture,
effectively performing equally to a fully-connected architecture. If this were the case in real
life, hierarchies would never need to grow beyond two levels (one manager connected to k
workers), which we know is not true.
Because we model communication and cooperation costs using agent work capacities,
if the number of workers assigned to a single manager grows and grows, the manager
will eventually become overwhelmed. When the quantity of letters needing to be shared
(received from workers) exceeds the manager’s work capacity, sharing gets delayed to
subsequent simulation time steps. This insight means there exists a threshold at which
adding more workers to a single manager stops improving system performance.
We claim that workers and managers have a limitation of how much work they can ac-
complish in a given time period. In terms of the word matching game simulation, when
an agent’s capacity is exceeded, new letters from the distribution are missed. We could
run simulations to explore this claim and determine the optimum number of workers to
connect to a manager, but that number would only apply to that specific architecture, set
of agent work capacities, organizational objective, and operating environment. Moreover,
real organizations rarely have the problem of having too many employees. More likely,
organizations strive to find the best set of tasks to assign workers and number of worker
connections that optimizes the organization’s performance. This is what we will explore in
Section 4.6.
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Challenges of examining more complicated architectures.
Previously in our research we analyzed architectures using one or both of the following
methods: 1) analytic mathematical equations, or 2) computer simulation using the word
matching game. When possible we solved mathematical equations directly, and for more
complicated systems of equations, we relied on a computer-aided matrix solver. Unfortu-
nately, as discussed in Section 4.3.2, as the number of agents in an architecture or the length
of an organization’s objective increases, the mathematical equations and/or submatrix T
necessary to represent more complicated organizations quickly grow in size and complex-
ity. In previous sections, we examine trivial and base case architectures that allow tractable
use of multiple analysis methods. An intentional by-product of doing so is to provide credi-
bility to the computer simulation we developed. We admit simulation results not supported
with analytic calculations are less convincing, but they remain informative when analytic
approaches pass a reasonable level of complication and scale.
4.6 Exploring Architecture Robustness
In this section, we consider the issue of organizational robustness, namely how an architec-
ture performs in the presence of either (1) changing objectives or (2) changing environments.
An architecture is considered robust if it can perform nearly as well given any objective or
operating environment. In terms of our game, a very robust architecture would be able to
effectively match any word given any letter distribution.
We begin this discussion by presenting a series of organizational architectures, in which
one manager is connected to as many as six workers in a two-tier hierarchy. We begin with
a simple three worker architecture as shown in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7. Two-Tier Hierarchy with One Manager and Three Worker Agents
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In terms of our word matching game, the objective of this architecture is to match the
word “TEACH.” Workers are assigned a primary task of one or two letters to match. Once
matched, they pass completed tasks to the manager. Workers are also aware of the overall
objective so they have a secondary task to pass to the manager any letters needed by other
workers. When the manager receives such a letter, it is given on the next turn to the worker
who needs it most, thus replacing the random letter the worker would have received from
the distribution on that turn.
Again, let S represent the state of space of the system. From the manager’s point of view,
the system begins in state S000, meaning the manager has no matches for “TE,” “AC,”





= 23.3745 ± 0.3071. In other words, on average the architecture takes approxi-
mately 23 discrete time steps to match “TEACH.” Without an analytic method of verifying
the simulation’s output due to the complex mathematics, we will not attempt to prove its
accuracy, instead we use it as benchmark for comparison in subsequent experiments.
Now, imagine the organization hired three additional workers, one for each of the three
primary tasks, as shown in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8. Two-Tier Hierarchy with 1 Manager and 6 Worker Agents
Effects of Changing Task Assignments. The selection of task assignments has a direct
impact on an architecture’s performance. By varying the worker task assignments depicted
in Figure 4.8, we use the word matching game simulation to show how an architecture’s
performance can change, even when the objective and environment remain the same.
Table 4.13 shows that of the four combinations of task assignments, the set of tasks on the
bottom row [TE,TE,TE,TE,AC,H] is best. This is evidence of how an organization can
customize worker task assignments in its architecture when the operating environment is
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known in order maximize performance. By assigning more workers to complete difficult
tasks, the organization’s performance increases. However, such specialized organizations
face higher risks of performance degradation due to their reduced robustness to change.
Table 4.13. Simulation Results When Varying Worker Tasks Using the Cor-
nell Distribution
Worker Number and Task
1 2 3 4 5 6 Expected Completion Time
TE AC AC H H H 12.1283 ± 0.1564
TE TE AC AC H H 11.4811 ± 0.1428
TE TE TE AC H H 11.2224 ± 0.1394
TE TE TE TE AC H 10.5901 ± 0.1259
The best set of task assignments depends on how dynamic an organization’s environment
and objective are and how willing an organization is to accept performance degradation. If
the environment or objective can change fluidly, then a specialized architecture with less
robustness is a poor choice. If an organization knows (or controls) its environment, it can
design an optimal architecture and assign worker tasks optimally.
Effects of a Changing Environment. Specialization of an architecture to a specific organi-
zational objective and/or operating environment can increase efficiency, but at the expense
of being less robust. Let us now examine the “TEACH” architecture using a new letter
distribution. In this distribution, named the Even Distribution, each of the 26 letters in
the alphabet has an equal probability of being chosen (1/26 = 0.03846). Using the Even
Distribution and the word matching game simulation, Table 4.14 shows the results of the
same four experiments listed in Table 4.13, but using the new letter distribution to simulate
a change in the architecture’s operating environment.
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Table 4.14. Simulation Results When Varying Worker Tasks Using the Even
Distribution
Worker Number and Task
1 2 3 4 5 6 Expected Completion Time
TE AC AC H H H 12.1883 ± 0.1069
TE TE AC AC H H 12.0773 ± 0.1072
TE TE TE AC H H 12.4031 ± 0.1090
TE TE TE TE AC H 12.8733 ± 0.1101
The simulation results in Table 4.14 show a decrease in performance compared to the
same sets of task assignments measured using the Cornell distribution. By comparing the
bottom row of each table [TE,TE,TE,TE,AC,H] we see an approximately 22% decrease in
performance when we change the environment by running the simulation with the Even
distribution. Next, imagine a hypothetical letter distribution in which T, E, A, C, and H hap-
pen to be the five rarest letters. Without simulating this scenario, we know this distribution
would result in a significant decrease in the “TEACH” architecture’s performance.
Note that the simulated results in Table 4.14, are all very close and have less variability
than in Table 4.13. Because no letter in the Even distribution is more or less probable than
another, the best architecture is one that divides tasks evenly amongworkers. For this reason,
the best choice of worker assignments for the Even distribution is [TE,TE,AC,AC,H,H],
which our simulation results support.
When an organization operates in an environment prone to change, it must adapt an architec-
ture that is not too specialized. By assigning tasks evenly among workers, an organization’s
performance may not be the highest possible, but it is more robust in performing in a variety
of possible operating environments.
Effects of a Changing Objective. If an organization’s objective is subject to change, a
specialized architecture will suffer a decrease in performance if the objective changes.
Consider an automobile factory that produces cars. How would you expect the factory to
perform the next day if it was required to begin making trucks? If not allowed to stop
manufacturing to reorganize tasks and processes (change its architecture), the factory’s
output would greatly suffer. Now, imagine that instead of changing to building trucks, the
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factory was forced to make boats. The factory’s output would likely be lower or even cease
all together.
In terms of our word matching game, let us explore how worker task assignments impact
an architecture’s robustness to a changing objective. First, to be robust, an architecture
must not have tasks that are too specific thus preventing an architecture from completing
a new objective. For example, consider the difficulty the “TEACH” architecture (Figure
4.8) would have if the organization’s objective changed to “CATCH.” The new objective
contains common letters with the original, but without changing the set of assigned tasks,
the existing architecture cannot match “CATCH.” This is because TE, AC, and H are too
specific of tasks to be capable of matching “CATCH.” Even the word “EACH” cannot be
matched using the architecture shown in Figure 4.8.
For an architecture to avoid significant performance degradation when its objective changes,
its set of assigned tasks must not be too narrow or specific. Let [T, E, A, C, H] be the new
set of available tasks that can be assigned to workers. Doing so requires a minimum of
five workers in the architecture, but now “TEACH,” “CATCH,” and “EACH” are objectives
that can be matched, thus increasing robustness. Table 4.15 shows the results of using the
word matching game to measure the architecture’s performance in matching three similar
but different objective words. The simulation uses the Cornell letter distribution and the set
of tasks [T, E, A, C, H, H], assigned to workers one through six, respectively.
Table 4.15. Simulation Results of Architecture with Task Set [T,E,A,C,H,H]
Objective: TEACH CATCH EACH
Expected Value: 9.6290 ± 0.1248 12.0540 ± 0.1518 14.4724 ± 0.1980
Obviously there are countless more experiments pertinent to exploring and measuring
organizational architectures, however the next step one might take is to explore the impact
of assigning one or more workers in the “TEACH” architecture as a non-assigned, flexible,
floater agent. A floater agent, in terms of our word matching game, can match any letter
needed that is not already assigned as a task to another worker. Figure 4.9 illustrates such an
architecture that can match its primary objective (“TEACH”), but also has the flexibility to
accomplish other objectives such as “BEACH,” “TEACHER,” and even “ZEBRA,” therefore
increasing the architecture’s robustness.
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Figure 4.9. Two-Tier Hierarchy with One Manager, Five Worker Agents, and
One Floater
With even one floater agent, this architecture can match any objective. If a new objective
happens to align well with the architecture’s existing worker assignments (like “BEACH”
or “TEACHER”) then the floater must only match a single extra letter. If the word is poorly
suited for the current task assignments such as the word “ZEBRA,” then the floater will have
to independently match all three new letters. In this case, the organization will eventually
complete the objective, but performance would suffer compared to objective words with
more letters common to those that are already assigned to workers.
In summary, we assert that organizations with a customized architecture tailored to com-
plete a specific objective in a stable environment will perform most efficiently, however
performance will suffer in the case of volatility in the objective or environment. Organiza-
tions willing to accept lower or zero performance in order to reorganize its architecture to
adapt to a new objective or environment will benefit from specialized hierarchies, known for
high efficiency, but low robustness. On the other hand, organizations that must accomplish
varying objectives or that operate in dynamic environments must choose a less specialized
set of worker tasks.
There exists an unlimited number of specific architectures in use by organizations today.
Arguably, all are orders of magnitude more complicated than any architecture we’ve exam-
ined in our research, however they are comprised of the building blocks and fundamental
relationships we present. While some organizations specialize at performing a specific task
over and over (e.g., manufacturing), others survive by adapting and innovating new products
to satisfy ever-changing consumer desires (e.g., technology innovators). The architecture
type that is best for any organization depends on how robust it must be to mitigate the risk
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of poor performance in face of changes or how quickly and correctly the organization can
reorganize to adapt to changes in its objective and/or environment. In the final chapter,
we revisit the features and traits of such architectures, like those that General McChrystal





This thesis presents a quantitative framework, in the form of a game, that imitates the
basic processes of an organization. The game is supported by mathematical analysis and
measures how well an organizational architecture performs in completing its objective in
a particular environment. We explore how to quantitatively measure an architecture by
examining simple architectures and incrementally expanding our research. By doing so,
we observe how different architectures react to change and what features of an architecture
most impact its robustness to change.
First, we show that adding independent (non-connected) workers to an architecture improves
overall performance, but at a much slower rate than if the same workers were connected
in a manner that allows them to communicate and cooperate. However, challenges arise
as an architecture grows in size. Adding workers can result in exponential growth in the
number of connections which eventually limits the performance of an architecture, despite
the number of workers added. This is because workers have a finite capacity of work, and
effort spent cooperating or communicating consumes some of that capacity. Eventually,
once the size of a fully-connected architecture grows beyond a threshold, performance
increases are not possible. To avoid this, larger architectures take advantage of carefully
selecting connections between workers. These architectures maximize the performance
advantages of connections while minimizing costs.
A hierarchy is one such architecture with minimal connections. We use the word matching
game simulation to test hierarchies with varying worker assignments and contrast perfor-
mance results. When splitting up an objective into smaller tasks to assign to workers,
we show how sensitive an architecture’s performance is to the environment and objective.
If either change, performance suffers. Such architectures are less robust to change when
they are customized to a specific objective and/or environment. With this foundation and
framework established, we gain insight into why the JSOTF originally failed in Iraq and
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why General McChrystal’s “team of teams” concept was a better fit.
Like a customized hierarchy tailored toward a specific objective in a stable environment,
the JSOTF’s performance against AQI was originally unsuccessful because its architecture
was too specialized to perform specific tasks which made it less robust to external changes.
Its architecture was defined by a centralized structure with a strict hierarchy of authority.
The task force was comprised of specialized units that didn’t have the connections and
processes to share information or cooperate effectively due to the vertical nature of its
architecture. This research addresses why, while being extremely efficient at their assigned
objectives, organizational architectures like that of the JSOTF, are less effective against an
unpredictable and agile enemy.
As General McChrystal describes in Team of Teams, his restructuring efforts changed the
JSOTF’s organizational architecture. The architecture became decentralized with decision
making authorized at lower levels, thereby freeing up available work capacity for senior
leaders. Additionally, the task force’s architecture maximized the advantages of cooper-
ation while limiting connections between workers by using teams and connecting them
horizontally with liaison officers. McChrystal’s new task force saw increased effectiveness
fighting a fluid enemy in multiple arenas. Although its architecture was potentially less
efficient at performing certain specific tasks than before, the collaborative and cooperative
characteristics of the new architecture became more robust and therefore more effective in
defeating a dynamic enemy like AQI.
5.2 Future Work
Options for future work include measuring the performance of more sophisticated architec-
tures. Such architectures might include the following.
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Multi-Tier Hierarchy
We recommend building upon the two-tier hi-
erarchy to study architectures with multiple
tiers. Of particular interest would be a sen-
sitivity analysis of how many workers and/or
managers should occupy each tier to maxi-
mize performance.
Team
We recommend the use of simulation to ex-
plore architecture design elements for more
organic and collaborative architectures. We
recommend testing to see whether or not a
threshold exists at which performance gains
cease as the size of a team architecture grows.
Team of Teams
A significant goal for future research would
be to connect multiple teams and measure the
robustness of new architectures of this type to
changing objectives and/or environments.
To implement these or othermore complicated architectures in the future, the wordmatching
game simulation would require enhancement. One addition might include adding a new
type of agent, such as a Leader, who is superior to Manager agents and has increased




One can imagine numerous additional experiments to better understand and identify fea-
tures that compose a best (most robust) architecture for accomplishing varying objectives
in dynamic environments. However, there is growing evidence (Eisenberg et al., 2014) to
suggest that the best architecture needs not be robust, but resilient. Contemporary discus-
sions concerning resilient organizations are less about finding the most robust architecture,
but understanding when to change an architecture’s features. Eisenberg et al. (2014) asserts
that resilience depends upon an architecture’s flexibility and interconnectedness. A resilient
architecture doesn’t have to mitigate all risk, but its features must be able to change fast
enough and correctly, for the organization to quickly recover after unforeseen challenges.
In discussing resiliency, Park et al. (2013) introduces four recursive processes that can lead
to the emergence of resilience in organizations.
1. Sensing. Observing the operational environment for changes and incorporating
observable information into the current understanding. “This process connects com-
ponents in the physical domain to the information domain” (Eisenberg et al., 2014).
2. Anticipation. Imagining future possible states. “This process connects components
in the information domain to the cognitive domain” (Eisenberg et al., 2014).
3. Adaptation. Changing as a result of sensing or anticipating. “This process connects
the cognitive domain to the physical domain” (Eisenberg et al., 2014).
4. Learning. Creating new knowledge or improving an organization’s understanding
based on past actions. “This process connects the physical, information, and cognitive
domains together” (Eisenberg et al., 2014).
The concepts and experiments in this research help orient future discussion of C2 architec-
tures with an operations research perspective. Our framework allows quantitative analysis
to compare and contrast architectures. By doing so we can more precisely discuss which
architecture components and processes best serve an organization’s goals.
Although motivated by McChrystal’s story, the most important piece of the Team of Teams
narrative is not the final topology of the task force’s architecture, but rather the importance of
an organization’s ability to identify the need for change, know what protocols are necessary




Agent. Each Organizational Architecture measured is comprised of one or more Agents.
In this research, Agents have two possible types: (1) Worker or (2) Manager. Every Agent
has a Primary Task, Secondary Task, and Work Capacity. Relationships and connections
between Agents in an Organizational Architecture are defined using three lists: (1) Parents,
(2) Children, and (3) Peers.
Agent Tasks. AnAgent’s Primary Task is the one or more letter component of theObjective
that the Organizational Architecture is trying to match. Secondary Tasks are defined as
required, to simulate other rules or processes of an architecture (e.g., sharing and filtering).
Architecture Robustness. How well an Organizational Architecture can complete its Ob-
jective in the presence of either (1) changingObjectives or (2) changing Environments. (See
C2 Effectiveness.) An architecture is considered robust if it can perform nearly as well given
any Objective or Environment.
Command and Control (C2). “Means by which a commander synchronizes and/or in-
tegrates for activities in order to achieve unity of command” (United States Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 2017). Painter et al. (2009) describes C2 using five domains: (1) Structure, (2)
Environment, (3) Work Processes, (4) Human Resources, and (5) Culture.
C2 Architecture. See Organizational Architecture.
C2 Effectiveness. “The net result of the successful interaction of a complex architecture
that is comprised of people, procedures, and equipment” (Bethmann and Malloy, 1989).
Communication and Cooperation. In this research, Communication and Cooperation
represent any type of action an Agent would do that involves interaction with another Agent.
Types of such interactions are commonly described as Vertical or Horizontal.
Environment. “Everything that exists outside the boundary of the organization and has the
potential to affect all or part of the organization” (Daft, 2001). See Game Environment.
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Fully-Connected Architecture. An architecture type characterized by two or more Agents
that are connected to all other Agents. These architectures are dense with connections and
have mostly Horizontal Communication and Cooperation rules.
Game. A Game, defined by Fullerton (2014), contains five major elements: (1) Compo-
nents, (2) Space, (3) Goals, (4) Mechanics, and (5) Rules. This research presents a Word
Matching Game used to measure the performance of an Organizational Architecture. It
measures how many simulation time-steps it takes to complete an Objective in a specific
Environment.
Game Objective. A word or combination of letters the Organizational Architecture being
measured must match. It is comprised of one or more Agent Tasks.
Hierarchical Architecture. An architecture type characterized by one of more Agents
connected to a single Agent using minimal connections and mostly Vertical Communication
and Cooperation rules.
Objective. Themission or goal an organization is designed to achieve. SeeGameObjective.
Organization. “(1) Social entities that (2) are goal oriented, (3) are designed as deliberately
structured and coordinated activity systems, and (4) are linked to the external environment”
(Daft, 2001).
Organizational Architecture (C2 Architecture or Organizational Structure). An or-
ganization’s architecture or structure is commonly represented on a chart that uses boxes
and lines to group organization members into assigned roles, depict formal reporting re-
lationships, and state spans of control. Additionally, “organizational architecture is about
the structure, processes, organizational roles, power and authority, reporting relationships”
(Galbraith et al., 2001). Alberts and Hayes (2006) describes three dimensions of Organi-
zational Architecture: “Allocation of Decision Rights,” “Distribution of Information,” and




The Department of Mathematics of Cornell University in 2004 published the following list 
of letters and their frequency of occurrences in a 40,000-word English dictionary.
Table B.1. Cornell University Letter Distribution
Letter Frequency Probability Letter Frequency Probability
A 14810 0.081238378 N 12666 0.069477738
B 2715 0.014892788 O 14003 0.076811682
C 4943 0.0271142 P 3316 0.018189498
D 7874 0.043191829 Q 205 0.001124502
E 21912 0.120195499 R 10977 0.060212942
F 4200 0.023038568 S 11450 0.062807524
G 3693 0.020257483 T 16587 0.090985886
H 10795 0.059214604 U 5246 0.028776268
I 13318 0.073054201 V 2019 0.011074969
J 188 0.00103125 W 3819 0.02094864
K 1257 0.006895114 X 315 0.001727893
L 7253 0.039785412 Y 3853 0.021135143
M 4761 0.026115862 Z 128 0.000702128
The Probability column is calculated by dividing each letter’s frequency by the total sum
of both Frequency columns (182,303).
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